FIRST
DIVISION
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SKIPPERS UNITED PACIFIC, INC., and
Petitioners, - versus
- Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 166363 Present: PANGANIBAN, C.J. Chairperson, YNARES-SANTIAGO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO,
JJ. Promulgated: August 15, 2006 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before
this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
seeking to review and set aside the Decision[1]
and Resolution[2] of the
Court of Appeals dated 27 July 2004 and 14 December 2004, respectively, in
CA-G.R. SP No. 80651, which declared null and void the Resolutions of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated 26 May 2003[3] and
8 September 2003.[4]
The
antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Herein
petitioners are Skippers United Pacific, Inc., the former manning agency for
the vessel MV Hanjin Vancouver, and its foreign
principal, J.P. Samartzsis Maritime Enterprises Co.,
S.A. Herein respondents Jerry Maguad and Porferio Ciudadano were recruited by petitioner Skippers United
Pacific, Inc., to work on board the afore-mentioned vessel as 4th
Engineer and Bosun, respectively. Respondents lodged a complaint against
petitioners before the NLRC. In their
Position Paper,[5] they alleged,
among other things, that:
Sometime in June 1998, complainants [herein respondents] were contracted by respondent [herein petitioner] Skippers [United Pacific, Inc.], to work on board the vessel MV “Hanjin Vancouver,” as Fitter for a contract period of nine (9) months plus or minus one (1) month pay [by] mutual consent. In a POEA contract of employment,[6] complainant had to work under the following terms and conditions:
POSITION : 4th Engineer
HOURS OF WORK : 48 hours/week
FIXED OVERTIME : US$160.80
OT AFTER 105/HRS : US$3.22
LEAVE PAY : US$107.20
POSITION : Bosun
HOURS OF WORK : 48 hours/week
FIXED OVERTIME : US$135.30
OT AFTER 105/HRS : US$2.71
LEAVE PAY : US$90.20
x x x x
However, [these] contracts were adjusted by respondent Skipper’s representative in the person of their General Manager, Ms. Gloria N. Almodiel, and was further noted by the Owner’s representative Mr. Filippos Karabatsis. The adjustments made were as follows[7]:
JERRY
P. MAGUAD
FIXED OVERTIME : US$681.00 (105 hrs)
LEAVE PAY : US$214.00
OVERSEAS ALLOWANCE : US$126.00
OT (AFTER 105/HRS) : US$6.61
FIXED OVERTIME : US$453.00 (105 hrs)
LEAVE PAY : US$142.00
OVERSEAS ALLOWANCE : US$126.00
OT (AFTER 105/HRS) : US$4.40
x x x x
On or about
However, on
Petitioners, on the
other hand, contended that they could not be held liable for illegal dismissal
because the respondents were dismissed for cause, that is, for
incompetence. The petitioners, in their
Position Paper before the NLRC, averred, among other things, that:
On or about 8 June 1998, complainants [herein respondents] Maguad and Ciudadano were both contracted by respondent [herein petitioner] Skippers United Pacific, Inc. (for and in behalf of its principal, J.P. Samartzsis Maritime Enterprises Co. S.A.) to serve as 4th Engineer and Bosun, respectively for the vessel MV “Hanjin Vancouver” for a contract period of nine (9) months plus or minus one (1) month by mutual consent for the following salaries:
FIXED OVERTIME PAY : US$160.80
OT AFTER 105/HOURS : US$3.22
LEAVE PAY : US$107.20
FIXED OVERTIME PAY : US$135.30
OT AFTER 105/HOURS : US$2.71
LEAVE PAY : US$90.20
On or about 24 June 1998, complainants boarded the vessel MV Hanjin Vancouver; however, less than one (1) month from their arrival on board said vessel, the vessel’s Master reported both complainants’ incompetence and the Owners in a telex message dated 21 July 1998 informed herein respondent Skippers United Pacific, Inc. of the urgent need to replace both Maguad and Ciudadano for their incompetence and enormous difficulties produced thereof to the work on board.
On or about 29 July 1998, both complainants
were repatriated from
Consequently,
upon repatriation, respondents filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal on
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that complainants [herein respondents] have indeed been illegally dismissed from their employment. Accordingly, respondents [herein petitioners] are hereby directed to pay [herein respondents] their respective three (3) months’ salaries, as follows:
(a) For Jerry P. Maguad – US$5,808.00
(b) Porferio L. Ciudadano – US$3,990.00
On appeal by petitioners, the NLRC en banc in its Resolution[11]
dated 31 May 2001, remanded the case to the Arbitration Branch of origin for
immediate further proceedings for failure of the Labor Arbiter to appreciate
material evidence such as: (1) the logbook extracts submitted by petitioners to
corroborate its defense that respondents were dismissed for incompetence and
(2) the confirmation letters presented by the respondents showing that they
were signed off to transfer to another vessel due to crew reduction per
Administration’s status and Owner’s Orders. Both parties had questioned the
authenticity and veracity of the documentary evidence presented by the opposing
party.
To
conform to the Resolution of the NLRC dated
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the above-entitled case is hereby DISMISSED for being devoid of legal merit.
To justify his findings, the Labor Arbiter made the following
discussions, thus:
After a careful re-evaluation of the evidence on record, this Office finds that it indeed overlooked the fact that there are pieces of evidence for the respondents other than the telex mentioned in the subject Decision. That contrary to its findings in the questioned Decision dated 20 September 1999 that respondents’ evidence in support of their defense in this case consists solely of an “uncorroborated telex message,” respondents actually have adduced other pertinent evidence such as logbook extracts and the Master’s Statement supporting such logbook entries. Be it emphasized at this juncture that in our jurisdiction, it is settled and recognized that logbook entries constitute prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein and have enjoy the stamp of presumption of regularity.[13]
Aggrieved, it was the respondents’ turn to interpose an
appeal before the NLRC en banc. The NLRC rendered a Resolution[14]
on
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is hereby affirmed. Complainant’s appeal is dismissed for lack of merit.
Respondents
moved for the reconsideration of the foregoing decision of the NLRC. However, said Motion for Reconsideration was
denied through a Resolution[15]
issued by the NLRC on
The
Court of Appeals rendered a Decision[16]
on
WHEREFORE,
in consideration of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari is perforce
granted. Accordingly, the Resolutions of
the public respondent NLRC dated
On
26 August 2004, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 27 July
2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals alleging that Skippers United Pacific,
Inc., should not be made liable because: (1) it is no longer the manning agency
responsible since Sea Power Shipping Enterprises, Inc., and Evic Human
Resources Management, Inc., had executed Affidavits of Assumption of
Responsibility, and (2) it has complied with the legal requirements for the
dismissal of an employee.
The
Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution dated
Hence,
this Petition.
Petitioners
submit that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in rendering its
Decision and Resolution dated
I Whether or not the warning notices given to respondents substantially [complied] with the requirements of the Labor Code in effecting a valid dismissal.
II Whether or not the Court of Appeals may reinstate a Decision of the Labor Arbiter, which the latter himself reversed and considered flawed.[18]
In
the Memorandum[19] filed
by petitioners, they maintain that there was just and valid cause for the
dismissal of the respondents. Thus,
petitioners posit that the only issue relevant to the dismissal of the
respondents in this Petition is the question on compliance with the two- notice
requirement mandated by the Labor Code, as amended.[20]
The
petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals seriously erred in not considering
the warning notices issued to respondents as substantial compliance with the
requirements laid down in the Labor Code, as amended, in effecting a valid
dismissal. According to petitioners, such
notices were issued days before respondents were signed-off on
Petitioners
further claim that it was reversible
error on the part of the Court of Appeals to reinstate a Decision of the Labor Arbiter,
which the latter himself reversed and considered flawed for his failure to
consider other pieces of evidence which were presented by both parties.
In
contrast, the respondents raise before this Court the following issues:
I. Whether or not Rule 45 is proper in the instant case.
II. Whether or not the decision of the Court of Appeals is erroneous.
III. Whether or not petitioner Skippers can be exempted from liability by the execution of Affidavits of Assumption of Responsibility executed by Sea Power Shipping Enterprises, Inc. and Evic Human Resources Management, Inc.
IV. Whether or not private respondents Maguad and Ciudadano are entitled to indemnity equivalent to the unexpired portion of their employment contract.[21]
Respondents
in their Memorandum[22]
aver that petitioners raised questions of facts when they contended that the
documents submitted to the Labor Arbiter already constitute the notices
required under respondents’ employment contracts, and that these notices served
as compliance with due process in effecting a valid dismissal; hence, Rule 45
of the Rules of Court is not the proper mode of appeal before this Court.
They
also maintain that their alleged incompetence was not properly proven and their
dismissal was tainted with illegality because they were not afforded due process. On this basis, respondents are claiming
entitlement to the amount of their salary for the unexpired portion of their
employment contract.
Lastly,
respondents aver that petitioner Skippers United Pacific, Inc. cannot be
exempted from liability despite the execution of the Affidavits of Assumption
of Responsibility by Sea Power Shipping Enterprises and Evic Human Resources
Management, Inc. because the above-mentioned affidavits are only valid and
binding between the principal and the manning agent. It should not affect petitioner Skippers
United Pacific, Inc.’s liability towards the seamen, specifically respondents,
because the liabilities of the said petitioner as manning agency is joint and solidary with its principal and respondents’ actual employer,
co-petitioner J.P. Samartzsis Maritime Enterprises
Co., S.A.
Given
the foregoing arguments raised by both parties, this Court identifies the
following issues for resolution in the Petition at bar, viz:
I. Can this Court take cognizance of the Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court considering that the petitioners raised issues of facts?
II. Whether the ground of incompetence as a just cause for a valid dismissal has been proven by substantial evidence.
III. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in its findings that there was non-compliance with the two-notice requirement in effecting a valid dismissal as mandated by the Labor Code, as amended.
IV. Whether the respondents are entitled to indemnity equivalent to the unexpired portion of their employment contract.
Although
as a rule, only legal issues may be raised in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, the Court is not precluded from delving into and resolving issues of
facts,[23]
particularly if the findings of the Labor Arbiter are inconsistent with those
of the NLRC and the Court of Appeals; if the findings of the NLRC and the
appellate court are contrary to the evidence and the record; and in order to
give substantial justice to the parties.[24]
In
this case, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC en
banc ruled that the respondents were validly dismissed by the petitioners
because of incompetence in performing their duties and responsibilities. In effecting such dismissal, the petitioners complied
substantially with the two-notice requirement for procedural due process in
labor cases. However, the Court of
Appeals stated in its
The
general rule is that, factual findings of the NLRC, particularly where the NLRC
and the Labor Arbiter are in agreement, are deemed binding and conclusive upon
the Supreme Court.[25] Such factual findings of labor officials are
conclusive and binding when supported by substantial evidence, meaning, that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion.[26] Thus, the Supreme Court will not uphold erroneous
conclusions of the NLRC as when it finds insufficient or insubstantial evidence
on record to support those factual findings.
The same holds true when it is perceived that far too much is concluded,
inferred, or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts appearing of record.[27]
Accordingly, the rule that the factual findings of the
administrative bodies are accorded great weight and respect and even finality
by this Court does not apply in the present case because of the apparent
conflict in the findings of the administrative bodies and that of the appellate
court. This Court therefore finds it necessary to go over the records of the
case to determine whether the dismissal of the respondents has been properly
proven by substantial evidence.
It
must be noted that in termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the
employer to show that the dismissal of the employee is for just cause and
failure to do so would mean that the dismissal is not justified. This is in consonance with the guarantee of
security of tenure in the Constitution[28]
and elaborated in the Labor Code.[29] A dismissed employee is not required to prove
his innocence of the charges leveled against him by his employer.[30] The determination of the existence and
sufficiency of a just cause must be exercised with fairness and in good faith
and after observing due process.[31] Hence, there are two requisites which must be
complied with by an employer for a valid dismissal, to
wit:
I. the dismissal must be for a just or authorized cause; and,
II. the employee must be afforded due process, i.e., he must be given opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.
The
Labor Code, as amended, laid down the just or valid causes in dismissing an
employee, thus:
Art. 282. Termination By Employer. – An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes.
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
In the case before this Court, the ground relied upon by the
petitioners in dismissing the respondents is
incompetence. Although incompetence or
inefficiency as a ground for a valid dismissal is not expressly written in
Article 282 as one of the just causes in dismissing an employee, this ground is
considered as analogous to those enumerated under said article. Additionally,
incompetence is a ground specifically provided for in Section H of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Standard Employment
Contract[32] to
validly dismiss an erring seaman. Such
incompetence or inefficiency is understood to mean failure to attain work goals
or work quotas, either by failing to complete the same within the allotted
reasonable period, or by producing unsatisfactory results.[33] In proving the alleged incompetence of the
respondents, the Labor Arbiter as well as the NLRC, based their findings on the
telefax message,[34]
logbook extracts, and the Master’s Statement Report.
While going over the records of the case, this Court finds that the
logbook extracts presented by the petitioners before the administrative bodies
failed to specify the particular acts or omissions of the respondents which
apparently displayed their alleged incompetence. Such details are vital
in proving whether the respondents are indeed incompetent to perform their
assigned duties and responsibilities. While
the logbook extracts presented by the petitioners dated
Additionally,
the entries in the logbook stating the alleged incompetence of the respondents
are contrary to what was stated in the confirmation letters issued by the
captain of the vessel on the same date that the respondents were repatriated to
Moreover,
the Master’s Statement Report,[38]
presented by the petitioners, to corroborate their claim that the dismissal of
the respondents was for just cause i.e.,
incompetence, was issued 17 days after the respondents were repatriated to
Manila and two months after the complaint for illegal dismissal was instituted
by the respondents before the NLRC. Consequently, such report can no longer be
a fair and accurate assessment of the respondents’ competence as the same was
presented only after the complaint was filed.
Clearly, its execution was a mere afterthought in order to justify the
dismissal of the respondents, which had long been effected before the report
was made; hence, such report is a self-serving one.
Accordingly,
this Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that it was not proven through substantial
evidence that the respondents were dismissed for just cause. The incompetence of the respondents as just
cause for their dismissal was not properly proven and the evidence submitted by
the petitioners before the administrative bodies are not enough to sustain the
dismissal of the respondents. For this reason, this Court is not convinced that
the respondents were legally dismissed.
Nonetheless, even if there is a valid ground in dismissing
the respondents, the petitioners cannot just dismiss them outright. The petitioners must also comply with the
second requisite, which is, to afford the respondents due process.
The
second requisite that must be complied with by an
employer for a valid dismissal is to afford the erring employee due process. The due process requirement is not a mere
formality that may be dispensed with at will.
Its disregard is a matter of serious concern since it constitutes a
safeguard of the highest order in response to man’s innate sense of justice.[39] The Labor Code does not, of course, require a
formal or trial type proceeding before an erring employee may be
dismissed. This is especially true in
the case of a vessel on the ocean or in a foreign port. The minimum requirement of due process in
termination proceedings, which must be complied with even with respect to
seamen on board a vessel, consists of notice to the employees intended to be
dismissed and the grant to them of an opportunity to present their own side of
the alleged offense or misconduct, which led to the management’s decision to
terminate.[40] To meet the requirements of due process, the
employer must furnish the worker sought to be dismissed with two written
notices before termination of employment can be legally effected, i.e., (1) a notice which apprises the
employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought;
and (2) the subsequent notice after due hearing which informs the employee of
the employers decision to dismiss him.[41]
Now,
in the case at bar, this Court is convinced that the petitioners also failed to
comply with the second requisite in effecting a valid dismissal, which is to
afford the respondents due process. As previously
discussed herein, to meet the requirements of due process, it is indispensable
upon the employer to furnish the employee sought to be dismissed with two
written notices. The warning notices[42]
given by the petitioners to the respondents cannot be deemed as substantial
compliance with the two-notice requirement as mandated by the Labor Code in
effecting a valid dismissal. Those
warning notices did not specify in detail the particular acts or omissions
committed by the respondents which showed their incompetence. Worse still it did not apprise them that
their dismissal was sought. Such notices
were stated in a general manner. It was
never mentioned therein that the petitioners would dismiss the
respondents. Although the petitioners
claimed that those notices were given to the respondents
days before they were repatriated, the same leaves much to be desired.
The
Labor Code requires both notice and hearing; notice alone will not
suffice. The requirement of notice is
intended to inform the employee concerned of the employer’s intent to dismiss
him and the reason for the proposed dismissal.
On the other hand, the requirement of hearing affords the employee an
opportunity to answer his employer’s charges against him and accordingly to
defend himself therefrom
before dismissal is effected.[43] In this case, after the warning notices were
given to the respondents, the petitioners did not give the respondents an
opportunity to present their sides by conducting a hearing as provided for in
Section 17 of the POEA Contract.[44] Instead, the petitioners, with breathless
speed, ordered the repatriation of the erring employees to
Inasmuch
as the respondents were illegally dismissed because the ground relied upon by
the petitioners were not substantially proven and there was non-compliance with
the two-notice requirement in effecting a valid dismissal, they are entitled to
the payment of indemnity. However, this
Court does not agree with the findings of the Court of Appeals that the
provisions of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the
Migrant Workers’ Act of 1995, is the law applicable in computing the amount of
indemnity to be paid to the respondents who have been illegally dismissed. The said Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042
partly provides:
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
This Court held in the case of Marsaman Manning Agency, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, [45] thus:
A plain reading of
Sec. 10 clearly reveals that the choice of which amount to award an illegally
dismissed overseas contract worker, i.e.,
whether his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or
three (3) months’ salary for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less, comes into play only when
the employment contract concerned has a term of at least one (1) year or
more. This is evident from the words
“for every year of the unexpired term” which follows the words “salaries x x x for three months.” To follow petitioners’ thinking that private
respondent is entitled to three (3) months salary only simply because it is the
lesser amount is to completely disregard and overlook some words used in the
statute while giving effect to some.
This is contrary to the well-established rule in legal hermeneutics that
in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part or word thereof
be given effect since the law-making body is presumed to know the meaning of
the words employed in the statute and to have used
them advisedly. Ut res
magis valeat quam pereat.
Furthermore,
in the case of Phil. Employ Services and
Resources, Inc. v. Paramio,[46]
citing the case of Skippers Pacific, Inc.
v. Skippers Maritime Service, Ltd.,[47]
this Court ruled that an overseas Filipino worker who is illegally terminated should
be entitled to his salary equivalent to the unexpired portion of his employment
contract if such contract is less than one year.
Having said that, we apply the foregoing principles to the present
case. Since the contract period
of the respondents is less than one year, more particularly, nine months plus
or minus one month by mutual consent; and they were illegally dismissed, then
they are entitled to their salaries equivalent to the unexpired portion of their
contract, and not just to three months salary.
With
respect to the petitioner Skippers United Pacific, Inc.’s claim that it be
exempted from liability because it is no longer the manning agency responsible
to the respondents since Sea Power Shipping Enterprises, Inc. and Evic Human
Resources Management, Inc. had executed Affidavits of Assumption of
Responsibility, this Court will not sustain such a claim. In Section 1 of Rule II of the POEA Rules and
Regulations, it states that:
Section 1. Requirements for Issuance of License. – Every applicant for license to operate a private employment agency or manning agency shall submit a written application together with the following requirements:
x x x
f. A verified undertaking stating that the applicant:
x x x
(3) Shall assume joint and solidary liability with the employer for all claims and liabilities which may arise in connection with the implementation of the contract; including but not limited to payment of wages, death and disability compensation and repatriation.
Accordingly,
despite the execution of the Affidavits of Assumption of Responsibility by
other manning agencies, the petitioner Skippers United Pacific Inc. cannot
exempt itself from all the claims and liabilities arising from the
implementation of the contract executed between the said petitioner and the
respondents. It is very clear from the
above-cited provisions of the Rules and Regulations of the POEA that the
manning agency shall assume joint and solidary liability with the employer. Joint and solidary liability is meant to
assure aggrieved workers of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due
them.[48] The reason for this ruling was given by this
Court in Catan v. National Labor
Relations Commission,[49]
which is reproduced in part below:
This must be so, because the obligations covenanted in the recruitment [manning] agreement entered into by and between the local agent and its foreign principal are not coterminus with the term of such agreement so that if either or both of the parties decide to end the agreement, the responsibilities of such parties towards the contracted employees under the agreement do not at all end, but the same extends up to and until the expiration of the employment contracts of the employees recruited and employed pursuant to the said recruitment agreement. Otherwise, this will render nugatory the very purpose for which the law governing the employment of workers for foreign jobs abroad was enacted.
Also, according to Section 10, paragraph 2 of Republic Act
No. 8042,[50] the
agency which deployed the employees whose employment contract were adjudged
illegally terminated, shall be jointly and solidarily liable with the principal
for the money claims awarded to the aforesaid employees.[51] Therefore, petitioner Skippers Pacific
United, Inc. as the manning agency which hired the respondents is jointly and
solidarily liable with its principal and co-petitioner J.P. Samartzsis
Maritime Enterprises Co., S.A., for the money claims of the respondents. The Affidavits of Assumption of
Responsibility, though valid as between petitioner Skippers United Pacific Inc.
and the other two manning agencies, are not enforceable as against the
respondents because the latter were not parties to those agreements. The provisions of the POEA Rules and
Regulations are clear enough that the manning agreement extends up to and until
the expiration of the employment contracts of the employees recruited and
employed pursuant to the said recruitment agreement. Hence, despite the execution of the
aforementioned affidavits, petitioner Skippers United Pacific Inc. cannot exempt
itself from the liabilities and responsibilities towards the respondents.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated 27 July 2004 and 14 December 2004, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP
No. 80651, finding that respondents had been illegally dismissed and that
petitioners failed to comply with the two-notice requirement of due process in
effecting a valid dismissal, are hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. The petitioners Skippers United Pacific, Inc.
and J.P. Samartzsis Maritime Enterprises Co., S.A.
are hereby ORDERED, jointly and severally, to pay respondents Jerry Maguad and Porferio Ciudadano the amount of their salaries corresponding to the
unexpired portion of their employment contract. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
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ROMEO J.
CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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Pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN Chief Justice |
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, with Associate Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria and Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente, concurring, rollo, pp. 23-42.
[2]
[3] Penned by Commissioner Angelita A. Gacutan with Presiding Commissioner Raul T. Aquino and Commissioner Victoriano R. Calaycay, concurring, CA rollo, pp. 31-40.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] Rollo, pp. 26-27
[10]
[11] Penned by Presiding Commissioner Lourdes C. Javier with Commissioners Ireneo B. Bernardo and Tito F. Genilo, concurring, CA rollo, pp. 78-81.
[12] Penned by Labor Arbiter Cresencio G. Ramos, Jr., rollo, pp. 52-55.
[13]
[14]
[15] CA rollo, 42-43.
[16]
[17] Rollo, pp. 23-42.
[18]
[19]
[20] Article 277. Miscellaneous Provisions. (a) x x x
(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to be protected against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause and without prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing a statement of the causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he so desires in accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment.
[21] Rollo, p. 163.
[22]
[23] Recognized exceptions to this rule are: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making the findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellee and the appellant; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; (10) when the findings of facts are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion (Langkaan Realty Development, Inc. v. United Coconut Planters Bank, G.R. No. 139437, 8 December 2000, 347 SCRA 542, 549; Nokom v. National Labor Relations Commissions, 390 Phil. 1228, 1243 [2000]; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Embroidery and Garments Industries (Phils.), Inc., 364 Phil. 541, 546-547 [1999]; Sta. Maria v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 275, 282-283 [1998]).
[24] Nasipit Lumber Company v. National
Organization of Workingmen (NOWM), G.R. No. 146225,
[25] Permex, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 380 Phil. 79, 85 (2000).
[26] Aklan Electric Cooperative Incorporated v. National Labor Relations Commission, 380 Phil. 225, 238 (2000).
[27] Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa M. Greenfield v. Ramos, 383 Phil. 329, 368 (2000).
[28] Article 13, Section 3, of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
[29] Article 277(b) of the Labor Code, as amended.
[30] Starlite Plastic Industrial Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission,
G.R. No. 78491,
[31] Fil-Pride Shipping Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 97068, 5 March 1993, 219 SCRA 576, 581.
[32] Section H of the POEA Standard Employment Contract reads:
1. x x x.
2. The master shall have the right to discharge or sign off the seaman at any place abroad in accordance with the terms and conditions of this contract and specially for the following reasons:
a. If the seaman is incompetent, x x x. (CA rollo, p. 48.)
[33] Buiser v. Leogardo, 216 Phil. 144, 152 (1984).
[34] Telefax
message from J.P. Samartzsis Maritime Enterprises
Co., S.A. dated
Reference is made to out fax of both (yesterday)
Pls.
attend substitution of full crew due incompetence and erroneous difficulties
produced thereof to the works and board the vessel as full:
x
x x
B. 4th Engin Maguad Jerry: They must sign-off both at
x
x x
D. Bosun Ciudadano
Proferio: He will sign-off and we shall send ourselves
one ex-Samartzsis crew.
Needless to underline that We
actually have best wages (T.C.C.) New Ships
first class owners and reliability in all respects and payments thus we simply
and most emphatically require best/able crew which will contribute and produce
the appropriate conditions in our cooperation.
We kindly remind the obvious rule that you should not
send onboard a man with doubtful
competency for a key position or any position.
(CA rollo, pp. 231-232.)
[35] Logbook
Extract dated
0235
[36] Logbook
Extract dated
1200.
p’ cloudy gale high sea very good CH OFF advised that Bosun Ciudadano
P. and Fitter Alegado L. are unable to perform safety
duties inspite of advises given to them. These are not capable to perform their duties
rendering unsafety for ship. (
[37] The confirmation letters were marked as Annexes C and D found in the CA rollo, pp. 61-62.
[38] Master’s
Statement Report of inefficiency indiscipline dated
To whom it may concern:
The undersigned G. Aravantinos Master of the above vessel hereby report the following in connection with
inefficiency and indiscipline of the following seamen onboard the vessel under my command.
1.
Maguad Jerry – 4th Engineer
He
was totally inexperience and inefficient in his duties putting ship’s safety in
risk and endangering the vessel.
x
x x
4.
Ciudadano Porferio – Bosun
He was inexperience and unable to perform
safety his duties. (
[39] Shoemart, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 74229,
[40] Klaveness Maritime Agency, Inc. v. Palmos, G.R.
Nos. 102310-12,
[41] Estiva v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 95145,
[42] To Bosun
Ciudadano,
Porferio
Warning
Notice
You
have repeatedly failed to comply with four officers’ orders and you do not
carry-out the works as per your duties.
This
is a warning to you for future compliance according to your contract.
To 4th Engineer
Jerry Maguad
Warning
notice
You
have last night during your duty stopped the boiler without informing your
superior officer with result of IFO temp to fall down and endanger the safety
operation of the engines/ship.
This
is last warning to you after my previous notices for future safe execution of
duties as per your contract. (CA rollo,
p. 234.)
[43] Century Textile Mills, Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. L-77859,
[44] The Master shall comply with the following disciplinary
procedures against an erring seafarer:
A. The Master shall furnish the seafarer
with a written notice containing the following:
1.
Grounds for the
charges as listed in Section 33 of this Contract or analogous act constituting
the same.
2.
date, time and place for a formal investigation of the
charges against the seafarer concerned.
B. The Master or his
authorized representative shall conduct the investigation or hearing, giving the
seafarer the opportunity to explain or defend himself against the charges. These procedures must be duly documented and
entered into the ship’s logbook.
C. If after the
investigation or hearing, the Master is convinced that imposition of a penalty
is justified, the Master shall issue a written notice
of penalty and the reasons for it to the seafarer, with copies furnished to the
[45] 371 Phil. 827, 840-841 (1999).
[46] G.R. No. 144786,
[47] 440 Phil. 906, 922 (2002).
[48]
[49] G.R. No. L-77279,
[50] Section 10. Money Claims. – x x x
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law shall be answerable for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.
[51] Phil. Employ Services and Resources, Inc. v. Paramio, supra note 44.